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It seems reasonable to think that what we are morally obliged to do will be in some way 
connected to what it would be morally good for us to do. However, a familiar line of thought in 
moral philosophy holds that there are limits on what we can be morally required to do. First, it is 
claimed that there is a limit to how demanding moral obligations can be. Second, the principle of 
ought-implies-can holds that we can only be morally required to perform acts that we are capable 
of performing. The aim of this timely collected volume is to address this gap in the literature by 
collecting papers that investigate the interrelations between these two debates and the 
consequences for how we should understand the nature of moral obligations. The book certainly 
succeeds in achieving this aim and makes an important contribution to the literature on the limits 
of moral obligation.  
The book begins with a helpful and impressively comprehensive overview from the 
editors of the literature on moral demandingness and ought-implies-can. After that the book 
divides roughly in two, with half the chapters focused primarily on moral demandingness and 
half focused primarily on ought implies can. I will explore two general themes that arise from 
this collection, focusing on those chapters that are most relevant to these themes.  
One interesting theme that emerges is that the existing literature on moral demandingness 
appears to rest on an overly simplified conception of what constitutes demandingness. Brian 
McElwee argues that there is an important lack of clarity in the literature on demandingness 
concerning precisely how we should understand demandingness in this context (p.22). Where an 
explanation is offered, it tends to be given in terms of cost. McElwee persuasively argues that 
this way of understanding demandingness is insufficient. The reason for this is that the difficulty 
of an action also contributes independently to how demanding it would be to morally require that 
action from people. McElwee defends this claim through an appeal to the appropriateness of the 
sentimental reactions commonly associated with a failure to perform a moral obligation. 
According to McElwee, if someone is morally obliged to act in a certain way then they will be 
worthy of blame if they fail to act in that way. This is important because feelings of blame are 
less appropriate for the failure to perform a morally good act that is difficult than one that is 
easy. As a result, we need to accept that difficulty also has role to play in placing limits on moral 
obligation. McElwee then claims that ought-implies-can may simply be a limiting case of this 
more general principle.   
The issue of the insufficiency of cost conceptions of demandingness arises again in Claire 
Benn’s discussion of the relationship between acts of supererogation (those that are beyond the 
call of duty) and moral demandingness. As Benn points out (p.70), a common thought in the 
literature is that supererogatory acts are those that are too costly to be demanded from people. 
After considering various ways of supporting this connection, Benn concludes that only ‘The 
Confinement Objection’, according to which a moral theory is too demanding if it confines the 
range of our permissible options, is plausible. However, a moral theory could avoid the 
confinement objection without making room for the supererogatory by allowing for the existence 
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of tied options (p.78). Benn concludes that there is only a contingent connection between 
supererogation and demandingness.  
The importance of getting clear on what exactly is meant by demandingness is further 
emphasized by Marcel van Ackeren’s detailed discussion of Joseph Raz’s view of moral 
demandingness. Reading these three essays together presents a convincing case that anyone 
wishing to object that a moral theory is too demanding ought to clarify exactly what is meant by 
demandingness. One way to do so is through a phenomenological investigation, as Sophie Grace 
Chappell does in her account of the way in which encounters with value can generate demands. 
One of Chappell’s key claims is that encounters with value, unlike encounters with ordinary 
objects, can be epiphanies. These are, “revelations to us of something that founds, or that 
revolutionizes, the whole way we see the world and think about value,” (p.85). This is an 
intriguing suggestion and Chappell does an exemplary job of motivating this thought through 
detailed discussion of examples from literature and history. However, more could have been said 
about exactly how we should understand what an epiphany is. Does Isaac Newton’s encounter 
with a falling apple that led to his insight into the nature of gravity count as an epiphany? It 
seems that it should but it doesn’t easily fit with the initial account Chappell provides, as it isn’t 
clear that this insight changed the way Newton though about value (though it did of course 
change the way he thought about gravity).  
Another interesting theme to arise from this volume is the agent-relativity of 
demandingness. What is demanding for one person may not be demanding at all for another. 
This point is touched upon by McElwee and developed in greater depth by Vanessa Carbonell, 
who argues that we need to not only ask whether morality is too demanding but also asking for 
whom morality is too demanding. Carbonell makes a convincing case that the demandingness of 
morality will vary greatly from person to person. Particularly interesting is Carbonell’s claim that 
certain obligations are triggered by the possession of a relevant form of knowledge (p.45), which 
as Carbonell points out may, “result in a stratified moral caste system, not to mention a 
disincentive to seeking education,” (p.48).  
Garrett Cullity touches on a similar issue. Cullity investigates a common argument that 
morality cannot demand extreme self-sacrifice from people, as they are unable to meet this 
standard (p.147). According to this argument, the ought-implies-can principle is capable of 
grounding an argument against overly demanding moral views. Cullity argues that while there 
are oughts and cans for which it does the impact of this is limited, as we can then be demanded 
to make ourselves someone with a greater capacity for self-sacrifice (p.159). The possibility of 
an obligation to morally develop oneself might help Carbonell avoid some of the worrying 
implications of her view, such as the disincentive to seek education. 
While these contributions make important contributions to the literature on moral 
demandingness, the collection might have been improved by the inclusion of a discussion 
concerning whether there is any reason to take demandingness objection seriously. Dale Dorsey 
comes closest to addressing this issue. Dorsey argues that there is a tension between the scope of 
morality and its normative force. To relate this to the issue of demandingness, if we allow moral 
obligations to demand too much from us, then we run the risk of downgrading the normative 
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force of these demands. Dorsey claims that this trade-off presents moral theorists with a choice 
to make. Either we decide first on the normative force of morality and then investigate the scope 
or we decide on the scope first and then examine the normative force. Given this choice, Dorsey 
provides two arguments in favour of opting for the scope first approach. First, scope is intrinsic 
to morality while force is extrinsic. Second, Dorsey claims that we cannot explain the normative 
force of morality unless we have a prior conception of the content of its demands. Both 
arguments are interesting, though it isn’t clear why we have to settle the content of either prior to 
asking about the content of the other. Why not think that we need to strike a plausible balance 
between the two? Dorsey’s response is to claim that this approach would leave us without an 
explanation for the normative force of morality but this argument struck me as one that needed 
further elaboration.  
The issue of whether to take the proposed limit to morality is more central in the chapters 
that focus on ought-implies-can. Matthew Kramer argues that we should not reject the possibility 
of moral conflict on the basis of ought-implies-can. Ishtiyaque Haji, on the other hand, defends 
ought implies can against a number of possible critiques based on examples where an agent 
appears morally responsible for her act despite having been incapable of acting otherwise.  In 
‘Why Does Ought Imply Can?’ Robert Stern considers four prominent theories of moral 
obligation and investigates what, if anything, might ground this principle according to these 
wider views of obligation. The issue is also central in Michael Kühler’s ‘Demanding the 
Impossible’, in which he argues that ought-implies-can is a moral principle not a conceptual 
claim about moral obligation.  
This is a fascinating collection of articles of that will be of interest to many working in 
moral philosophy and essential reading for all who work on the nature of moral obligation and its 
limits.  
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